I. INTRODUCTION
THE RISE OF global citizen action has been one of the most striking features of the post Cold War world, marked by increasingly powerful transnational NGO networks and global social movements that have already changed forever the terms of public debate on globalization. The recent successes of these networks are well documented, (1) including the landmines campaign, Jubilee 2000 and the burgeoning international movement to promote access to low-cost drugs for HIV/Aids and other killer diseases. However, and especially after the violent gridlock of the G8 summit meetings in Genoa, Italy, there is a more sombre mood to these celebrations, a more critical atmosphere within global civil society networks about their strengths and weaknesses, and increasing questions about legitimacy, accountability and structure.
In this article, I want to look briefly at whether movements such as Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) and similar community to community exchanges can shed light on these questions, and their answers. Can they provide useful models for the future, as global citizen action continues to evolve?
The rise of SDI is well documented in the literature (2) and I won't attempt to describe this remarkable story in any detail here. Since 1990, slum and shack dwellers in Asia, South Africa and elsewhere have supported a gradually expanding programme of direct, community to community exchanges aimed at transforming the lives and livelihoods of urban citizens. This movement (since that is what is has become) has since grown to include over 650,000 people in 11 countries. SDI has also sparked the emergence of similar exchanges between other communities, including home-based and street-based workers and communities affected by multinational mining operations.
What makes these movements different from most other transnational citizen networks is that the locus of power and authority lies and is kept in the communities themselves rather than in intermediary NGOs at the national and international levels. This is partly because SDI and its counterparts were not set up to influence global policy-making or lobby the international financial institutions (though they are now playing an increasing role in doing both these things). Rather, they aimed to promote practical solidarity, mutual support and the exchange of useful information about development strategies and concrete alternatives among their 
II. FALL FROM GRACE: THE PROBLEMS OF "GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY"
AS A RESULT of the political openings of the last decade, NGOs and citizen networks such as SDI feel they have the right to participate in global decision-making, yet much less attention has been paid to their obligations in pursuing this role responsibly, or to concrete ways in which these rights might be expressed in the emerging structures of global governance. This has given the critics of the anti-globalization movement (and their numbers are rising) an opportunity to tell a now-familiar story about the weaknesses of global citizen action. These criticisms usually focus on four areas: legitimacy and representation (NGOs who claim to speak on behalf of others but lack any accountability mechanisms to their constituents); structure (too many voices from the North and too few from the South or from the grassroots anywhere); expertise (are NGO positions tested and substantiated with any level of rigour?); and the weakness of linkages between citizen action at the local, national and global levels (the tendency to "leap-frog" over national debates and go direct to Washington or Geneva (4) ).
The first set of issues -and by far the most contentious -concerns questions of legitimacy. Who -if anyone -do NGOs represent, or are they just unaccountable special interest groups that wear a more friendly disguise? Who enjoys the benefits and suffers the costs of what the movement achieves, especially at the grassroots level? Who speaks for whom in an NGO alliance and how are differences resolved when participants vary in strength and resources? Whose voice is heard, and which interests are ignored, when differences are filtered out in order to communicate a simple message? In particular, how are grassroots voices mediated by institutions of different kinds -networks and their members, Northern NGOs and Southern NGOs, Southern NGOs and community groups, and so on down the line?
When NGOs claim to "represent" the poor, they are rarely specific about which poor people they are representing, or how. Actually, most NGOs are more sophisticated than this and accept that their policy positions are their own, even if substantial consultation has taken place with "partners" in the South. But a lack of transparency about who is really speaking, combined with the extreme asymmetry of global networks, makes NGOs easy targets for criticism on these grounds. For example, only 251 of the 1,550 NGOs associated with the UN Department of Public Information come from the South and the ratio of NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC is even lower. On some issues (such as debt or landmines), there is a solid South-North consensus in favour of a unified lobbying position. However, in other areas (especially trade and labour rights and the environment), there is no such consensus, since people may have conflicting short-term interests in different parts of the world. As globalization proceeds, these areas will become the centrepiece of the international system's response, so it is vital that NGO networks develop a more sophisticated way of acknowledging and addressing differences of opinion within civil society in different localities and regions.
Stronger accountability downwards to the grassroots is an important part of the answer to this problem. For example, what if the NGOs who protested so loudly in Genoa turn out to be wrong in their assumptions about the future benefits that flow from different trading strategies -who pays the price? Not the NGOs themselves but, rather, farmers in the Third World who have never heard of Christian Aid or Save the Children but who will suffer the consequences for generations to come. Global NGO networks must be carefully scrutinized to establish whose interests are driving the agenda.
The second criticism of global citizen action concerns the accuracy of NGO positions, which are often criticized as crude and simplistic, poorly researched and driven by fashion and sensation rather than loyalty to the facts or to any public constituency. In fact, many NGOs have substantial research departments and Oxfam's critiques are even cited by the IMF. Nevertheless, there is always a temptation in NGO campaigns to trade off rigour for speed and profile. The challenge lies in building analytical capacity and rooting alternative policy positions in the views and evidence of real communities.
Much of the current wave of criticism of global citizen action is confused because it conflates "legitimacy" with "representation." Legitimacy is generally understood as the right to be and do something in society -a sense that an organization is lawful, admissible and justified in its chosen course of action -but there are different ways of validating these things: through representation (which usually confers the right to participate in decision making) and through effectiveness (which only confers the right to be heard). Legitimacy in membership bodies is claimed through the normal democratic processes of elections and formal sanctions that ensure that an agency is representative of, and accountable to, its constituents. By contrast, non-membership NGOs define their legitimacy according to legal compliance, effective oversight by their trustees and recognition by other legitimate bodies that they have valuable knowledge and skills to bring to the table. But both forms of legitimacy are valid.
Transnational civil society is far from democratic and few networks have democratic systems of governance and accountability. Nevertheless, the increasing voice of NGOs adds an essential layer of checks and balances to the international system and helps to ensure that excluded views are heard. The challenge is to structure global citizen voices in ways that combat, rather than accentuate, existing social, economic and political inequalities.
III. PROBLEMS OF DISCONNECTION -ARE GLOBAL MOVEMENTS IN TOUCH WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES?
GLOBALIZATION REQUIRES BOTH governments and citizens to link their different levels of activity together -local, national, regional and global. For governments, this task is somewhat more straightforward since they have a chain of inter-governmental structures, such as the United Nations, through which debate and decision-making can be linked; at least in theory. The situation is much more challenging for citizen organizations since there are no formal structures to facilitate supra-national civic participation. As a result, international advocacy is The outcome is that civic groups (and NGOs in particular) find it difficult to build their policy platforms democratically and end up by circumventing the political processes that could supply some answers to the criticisms of legitimacy explored above. These problems are not helped by a tendency among some NGOs to focus on global advocacy to the exclusion of the national-level processes of state-society relations that underpin the ability of any country to pursue progressive goals in an integrated economy. There is always a temptation to go direct to global power centres, where it is often easier to gain access to senior officials and achieve a response. This is understandable but, in the long term, it is a serious mistake. It increases the influence of multilateral institutions over national development and erodes the process of domestic coalition-building that is essential to the development of pro-poor policy reform. In addition, the constant appearance of NGOs in international fora, combined with the dominance of NGO voices from the North, reinforces the suspicion among Third World governments that these are not genuine global alliances but yet another example of the rich world's monopoly over global debates. The NGOs concerned may see themselves as defending the interests of the poor but it is still outsiders -not the government's own constituents -who are deciding the agenda. There is a danger that the high profile and accessibility of global protests will detract from the real business of local politics, where participation is much more meaningful and NGOs can add real value to building a democratic national consensus on each society's response to globalization.
Addressing this problem requires a different way of building international alliances, with more emphasis on horizontal relationships among equals; stronger links between local, national and global action; and a more democratic way of deciding on strategy and messages. Jubilee 2000 (though a relatively easy case because of the absence of any South-North fault line) provides some good examples of these innovations. In Uganda, for example, local NGOs developed a dialogue with their own government on the options for debt relief, supported by technical assistance from Northern NGOs such as Oxfam. The results of this dialogue were then incorporated into the international debt campaign.
SDI and its counterparts offer another -and potentially even more important -set of innovations that go some way to answering the critics. These do not resolve the problems of global citizen action, nor would they claim to -these are movements that have arisen for specific purposes in specific contexts, for whom global policy advocacy has usually been a secondary consideration. Nevertheless, by evolving in ways that are substantially different from other transnational civil society networks, organizationally and structurally, SDI does have many useful lessons to teach. Their experience shows that there are different ways of organizing global citizen action that may be more effective in dealing with issues of accountability, legitimacy and structure.
In terms of legitimacy and accountability, SDI scores highly becauseas a membership organization -it can develop formal and democratic internal accountability procedures. It is also significant that most of the leaders of the movement come from within the communities concerned.
In terms of the problems of "disconnection", SDI is rooted much more solidly in real communities of shack and slum dwellers, who are just as concerned with problems and solutions at the local level as at higher GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION levels in the system. The global activities of the movement are the "icing on the cake" so to speak -layered on top of local and national campaigns instead of displacing attention to distant international institutions. Indeed, if this were not the case the movement would probably fall apart since its members would be unlikely to receive any tangible benefits in the short term.
In terms of its structure, SDI is much more a movement of equals than most NGO networks and a majority of its members are from Africa and Asia. This is the mirror image of many global campaigns, which are heavily dominated by Northern NGOs accustomed to the power relations of foreign aid. These power relations make it almost impossible for large non-governmental institutions to stand back, make space for grassroots voices and allow the agenda to be driven from the bottom up.
As the world moves toward a more genuinely democratic system of global governance, huge questions remain and they are certainly demanding. Many of these questions relate to how to make civic participation at the global level more genuinely inclusive and democratic, and their answers are as yet unclear. However, a century ago we could not have imagined the extent to which citizens across the world have since succeeded in their struggles for more complete and inclusive democracies in their localities and national polities. In the twenty-first century, the globalization of power demands a new form of global citizen action that extends the theory and practice of democracy still further. SDI and its counterparts in other communities are pioneers along this journey.
